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1. Introduction 
Understanding the determinants of disability participation is becoming an increasingly important issue 
for policy makers. Between 1980 and 1999, the share of non-elderly adults receiving disability 
benefits in the United States increased 60 percent to 4.7 percent.1 Across the OECD as a whole, 
disability participation rates increased 36 percent over the period, to 6.4 percent.2 The dramatic growth 
in disability participation rates has important implications for national productivity and the public 
financing of disability benefit programs. In 1999, disability benefit payments comprised 1.4 percent of 
GDP in the U.S. and 2.5 percent of GDP across countries in the European Union. 
Notably, the substantial growth in disability rolls has occurred without any change in the 
prevalence of self-reported disabilities (e.g. Burkhauser et al. 2001; Cutler and Richardson 1997; 
Duggan and Imberman 2006). In contrast, convincing evidence exists that economic conditions affect 
disability participation. Black, Daniel and Sanders (2002) demonstrate that the coal boom and 
subsequent bust had a large impact on disability participation in U.S. coal-producing states. Autor and 
Duggan (2003) find that decreasing demand for low-skilled workers and increases in their disability 
benefit replacement rate have led to large increases in the disability participation of high school 
dropouts. Autor and Duggan (2006) also cite the increasing real value of Medicaid benefits and 
liberalization of the screening process as contributing to increased rates of disability insurance use in 
the U.S. These and other studies suggest an important role for non-health factors in workers’ decision 
to apply for and draw disability benefits.3 
In this paper we empirically investigate the magnitude of social interaction effects in disability pension 
(DP) participation in Norway. Specifically, we investigate how a worker’s propensity to draw DP is 
affected by a plausibly exogenous shock to the disability entry rate of similarly-aged workers in his 
neighborhood. A large and growing empirical literature suggests an important role for social 
interactions in many behavioral outcomes including teenage childbearing (Crane 1991), educational 
attainment (Sacerdote 2001; Hoxby 2000; Lalive and Cattaneo 2005 ), saving decisions (Duflo and 
Saez 2003), criminal activity (Case and Katz 1991; Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman 1996; Katz, 
Kling and Liebman 2001; Ludwig, Duncan and Hirschfield 2001; Kling, Ludwig and Katz 2005) and 
welfare participation among ethnic minorities (Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan 2000; Aizer and 
Currie 2004). If social interaction effects exist in the context of disability insurance, it could help 
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 Statistics on disability program use and expenditures obtained from OECD (2003). 
2
 Throughout this paper, we employ the colloquial expressions “on disability” and “disability participation” to refer to the 
utilization of disability pension benefits.  
3
 See Rupp and Stapleton (1995) and Stapleton et al. (1998) for related studies on the impact of economic climate on the 
application and receipt of disability benefits.  
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explain the wide variation in disability participation across geographic areas (McCoy et al. 1994) and 
over time. Moreover, the magnitude of such effects is critical for predicting the impact of policy 
reforms, demographic changes and economic shocks on disability participation rates.  
In the context of disability participation, social interaction effects could potentially operate 
through a number of mechanisms. For example, social norms against disability participation could 
reduce the desirability of participating by imposing a utility cost in the form of social stigma (Moffitt 
1983; Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull 1999).4 The magnitude of this stigma is expected to decline as 
disability participation among one’s peers increases, thereby reducing one’s utility cost of entering 
disability. In this way social interaction effects give rise to a social multiplier that amplifies the effect 
of policy changes and economic shocks on aggregate participation rates (see e.g. Brock and Durlauf 
2001; Glaeser and Scheinkman 2003). Any change that directly affects individuals’ rate of disability 
use will have an additional indirect effect through the influence that one’s participation has on others.  
Identifying social interaction effects in observational data is complicated by problems of omitted 
variable bias.5 Peers are likely similar in ways unobservable in data and are also likely subject to 
similar unobserved shocks. In this paper, the problem of omitted variable bias is addressed by 
employing a novel instrumental variable (IV) strategy similar to the “partial population intervention” 
approach advocated by Moffitt (2001). Our strategy hinges on the empirical observation that plant 
downsizing events have a substantial effect on disability entry rates (Rege, Telle and Votruba 2007). 
We therefore use plant downsizing at neighbors’ plants of employment as an instrument for the 
disability participation rate among one’s previously employed neighbors.6 The intuition behind this 
approach is straightforward: if social interaction effects exist, then neighborhoods disproportionately 
affected by plant downsizing events should exhibit a relative increase in disability entry rates, even 
among workers not directly affected by downsizing.  
Social interaction effects estimated under this IV strategy will not suffer from omitted variable 
bias provided downsizing rates in neighbors’ plants of employment are uncorrelated with 
unobservable determinants of DP participation. This identifying assumption is potentially problematic 
because downsizing events concentrated within a particular neighborhood could reflect or cause a 
decline in local economic opportunities. Alternatively, plant downsizing may be concentrated in 
neighborhoods populated by persons with higher propensities to utilize DP. The richness of our data, 
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 Social norms are only one possible channel through which social interaction effects might operate in disability participation. 
Section 2 discusses two other possibilities: leisure complementarities and information exchanges. 
5
 Manski (1993, 1995) catalogs the range of estimation problems in observational studies of social interaction effects, though 
our terminology varies somewhat from his. In particular, what we label “social interaction effects,” Manski refers to as 
“endogenous effects.”   
6
 Throughout, we use the term “plant” to refer to the establishment at which a worker is employed, which is distinct from the 
firm of employment (as firms can consist of multiple plants).    
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an 11-year panel dataset containing socio-economic information, employment data, and disability 
participation records for every person in Norway, allows us to indirectly test the validity of our 
identifying assumption. 
 Our analysis indicates that social interaction effects play an important role in DP participation. Our 
IV estimates suggest that a one percentage point increase in the participation rate of previously employed 
neighbors increased the subsequent 4-year entry rate of workers employed at the end of 1999 by roughly 
0.5 percentage points. This has important policy implications, suggesting the direct effect of demographic 
shifts, policy changes, health shocks and economic shocks on disability participation understates (by 
roughly one third) the full response expected in equilibrium.  
2. Social Interaction Effects 
The logic of social interaction effects rests on notions of utility interdependence. That is, when one’s 
peers engage in a particular behavior, it can potentially affect one’s own utility from engaging in that 
behavior. In the context of disability participation, this interdependence could operate through at least 
three channels: social norms, information and leisure complementarities.  
Disability participation is likely affected by social norms regarding “appropriate” participation 
behavior.7 Coleman (1990) defines a social norm as a rule of behavior that is enforced by social 
sanctions, which can take the form of stigma. Social interaction effects arise if social norms are 
conditional in nature, that is, when the stigma associated with not adhering to a norm is felt more 
strongly when one’s peers adhere to the norm. For instance, a person with a marginal disability would 
likely feel a higher degree of social stigma from drawing disability benefits if surrounded by peers 
devoted to their work. Thus, as disability participation increases among one’s peers, the incentive to 
apply for DP among non-recipients is expected to increase. 
There exists some empirical evidence that suggests an important role of social norms in 
welfare utilization. Though not specific to disability programs, Moffitt (1983) finds evidence for a 
stigma related disutility of welfare participation. Horan and Austin (1974) document negative self-
characterization and lack of self respect among welfare recipients. Flaa and Pedersen (1999) document 
that 20 percent of welfare program recipients in Norway feel a loss of social approval.  
In addition to the stigma associated with social norms against drawing disability, navigating 
the application process may incur a cost in terms of time and frustration. Peers familiar with this 
process can be a valuable source of information for would-be applicants, reducing the cost of filing an 
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 See Moffitt (1983), Besley and Coate (1992) and Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (1999) for theoretical models of social 
norms and economic incentives in the welfare state. 
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application. This information transfer implies that the cost of applying for disability is lower when 
more of one’s peers draw disability.  
Alternatively, a person on disability will have more time available for leisure activities than 
one engaged in work. Disability participation by one’s peers can increase one’s value of leisure, 
making it more attractive to draw disability. Similar to social norms and the information channel, this 
implies that a person’s likelihood of drawing disability increases when participation among his peers 
increases. 
Regardless of the channel through which social interaction effects operate, these effects give 
rise to a social multiplier, and possibly to multiple equilibria, that amplifies the effect of policy 
changes, demographic shifts and health or economic shocks on aggregate participation rates.8 Any 
change that directly affects an individual’s likelihood of drawing disability will have an additional 
indirect effect through the influence that the individual’s participation has on others. For example, if 
an economic shock decreases the opportunity cost of drawing disability for a subset of workers, the 
subsequent increase in disability participation could reduce the stigma associated with drawing 
disability, thereby increasing participation rates even among those not directly affected by the shock. 
This self-reinforcing process continues until a new equilibrium is reached.  
3. Disability Pension Program in Norway 
The Norwegian Disability Pension (DP) program9 serves a similar function as the combined disability 
programs of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in 
the U.S. A basic and a supplementary pension provide a benefit that is increasing and concave in prior 
earnings similar to SSDI, and a special supplement ensures a minimum benefit amount similar to SSI. 
Even though the Norwegian and U.S. programs have similar benefits formulas, increasing at a 
decreasing rate in past earnings, the Norwegian disability program is more generous, providing a 
higher earnings replacement rate particularly for low income workers. 
Another important difference between the Norwegian and U.S. programs is that the 
Norwegian program allows workers to apply for DP while still employed. As a result, it is common for 
Norwegian workers to receive “sick money” prior to transitioning from employment onto disability 
without ever being unemployed. Sick money refers to temporary assistance (up to one year) provided 
to disabled workers, ensuring benefits equal to 100 percent of earnings up to some maximum level. 
After one year, workers can draw a somewhat smaller rehabilitation pension until returning to work or 
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 For a formal analysis see e.g. Glaeser and Scheinkman (2003) or Brock and Durlauf (2001). 
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 See Rege, Telle and Votruba (2007) for a more detailed description of Norway’s disability pension program. 
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entering DP. During the first 12 months of sick absenteeism, when the worker is typically covered by 
sick money, Norwegian law makes it particularly difficult to formally dismiss sick workers. Therefore, 
unlike the U.S., it is not uncommon for disability entrants to enter directly from employment. 
Moreover, sick money use at a given time is a strong predictor of future entry onto DP. 
It is also worth noting that workers applying for disability benefits can receive a temporary 
disability pension if it is apparent that the worker will qualify for the permanent benefit. In measuring 
DP participation we include both temporary and permanent DP recipients, as the vast majority of 
temporary DP recipients go on to receive permanent DP.    
4. Empirical Strategy 
The current section describes our strategy for estimating the impact of DP participation among a worker’s 
peers on that worker’s decision to enter DP. Figure 1 provides a visual depiction of the timeline 
underlying our analysis. For the purpose of this paper, we analyze DP entry rates through 2003 of 
Norwegian workers age 45-63 in 1999.10 For reasons that will become clear, we restrict our attention to 
workers who were full or part time employed in both 1995 and 1999. Therefore, our results are specific to 
older Norwegian workers with reasonably strong ties to the workforce.   
Our hypothesis is that a worker’s decision to enter DP is influenced by the DP participation of her 
or his peers. Defining “peer groups” from existing data sources is always somewhat arbitrary. Ideally, we 
would like to identify the individuals with whom a given worker interacts.  Lacking such data, peer 
groups are commonly defined by geographic proximity and/or by characteristics suggestive of “social 
proximity” (e.g. similar socio-economic or employment characteristics). In this paper, we define peer 
groups according to proximity in geography, age and employment status. Specifically, the peer group of 
each worker is assumed to consist of similarly-aged native Norwegians residing in the worker’s 
neighborhood in 1995 and, like the worker, employed full or part time in 1995.   
Norway is divided into 14,211 geographically-defined neighborhoods (grunnkrets). These 
neighborhoods are small in both geographic area and population. On average, an individual lives in a 
neighborhood with 614 native citizens.11 Thus, it is reasonable to assume that people within a 
neighborhood do in fact interact with each other. Peer groups are further limited to other workers in the 
neighborhood for two reasons. First, we might expect that workers would be more influenced by the 
behavior of other workers in their neighborhood than by non-workers. Thus, if social interactions 
influence DP participation, we would expect this influence to be observable across similarly-aged 
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 We always refer to the status at the end of a year, i.e. at 12/31/yyyy. 
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 Among workers in our sample the mean neighborhood native population size is 691 (see Table 1 Panel C).  The difference 
reflects our selection criteria which led to the exclusion of workers in the smallest neighborhoods. 
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workers residing in the same neighborhood. Second, as we describe below, our empirical strategy relies 
on an instrument that is specifically applicable to the DP entry of workers.   
In the following sections, we describe a conventional approach to estimating social interactions 
effects in order to highlight the biases likely to plague such an approach. Following this, we describe the 
instrumental variable approach taken in this paper.     
4.1. Baseline Approach 
By way of example, we define the following linear probability model for the likelihood that a worker 
who is employed in 1999 draws DP by 2003:  
(1) 0 1 2 32003 2000  i i i i i iDP X N P PeerDPα α α α φ ε= + + + + +  
where  
2003iDP  ~ indicator that worker i draws DP in 2003 
2000iPeerDP  ~ participation rate among i’s peers in 2000  
iX  ~ vector of 1999 characteristics of worker i  
iN  ~ vector of 1995 characteristics of i’s neighborhood and municipality 
iP  ~ vector of 1995 characteristics of i’s peer group 
iε  ~ error term with mean zero 
 
The parameter of interest in equation (1) is φ , which captures the impact of DP participation in 2000 
among i’s peers on i’s propensity to draw DP by 2003. Note that since peer groups consist of persons 
working in 1995, the covariate of interest ( 2000iPeerDP ) captures the DP entry rate of one’s peers over 
1995-2000. 
Assuming 2000iPeerDP  is independent of unobservable determinants of workers’ DP entry 
decision ( iε ), standard (non-IV) estimation of equation (1) will provide an unbiased estimate of φ . 
However, the plausibility of this assumption is undermined by several potential problems.12  
First, because individuals self-select into neighborhoods, it is possible that neighbors are similar 
in terms of their probability of becoming disabled or their distaste for work, yielding higher DP 
participation rates in some neighborhoods than others. Second, workers within a given neighborhood are 
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 Manski (1993, 1995) provides a more complete and general analysis of the reflection problem in identifying social 
interaction effects. Our discussion of the identification issues is intended to address issues relevant in the context of disability 
application and participation. 
9 
similar in terms of the economic environment in which they work and/or search for work. Third, the DP 
screening process applied to applicants could vary across different locales affecting DP entry rates across 
neighborhoods. Each of these stories could explain why we might expect a positive within-neighborhood 
correlation of DP entry behavior even in the absence of social interaction effects. Unless these potential 
confounders are fully addressed by the included covariates, we might expect a positively-biased estimate 
of φ  when equation (1) is estimated using standard (non-IV) approaches. Notably, randomly assigning 
workers to neighborhoods would alleviate only the self-selection bias, not the other two sources of bias, 
which highlights the difficulty in generating plausible estimates of social interaction effects. 
In contrast, the dynamic nature of our model raises potential sources of negative bias in 
estimates of φ . First, randomness in the timing of DP entry among those entering can be a source of 
negative bias. To see this, consider a worker who might have entered DP either before 1999 or after 
2000. If the worker enters DP earlier rather than later, he contributes to a higher 2000iPeerDP  but the 
peer entry rate going forward is less than what we would otherwise measure. Therefore, in the absence 
of social interaction effects (and assuming away other potential sources of bias), we would expect 
standard estimates of φ  to be negative. 
Second, if social interaction effects do exist, some of the residual variation in 2000iPeerDP  
potentially captures out-of-equilibrium variation in DP entry behavior. For instance, suppose that in the 
period preceding our analysis, workers in different neighborhoods were subject to varying shocks that 
affected DP entry. As a result, some of the residual variation in 2000iPeerDP  could reflect social 
spillovers from these past shocks, as the peer DP participation rate converges to a new equilibrium. 
Provided that peer groups fully equilibrate from pre-1995 shocks in the 1995-2000 period, the out-of-
equilibrium variation in 2000iPeerDP  is not expected to influence DP entry going forward, leading to 
attenuation bias in standard estimates of φ . In the absence other sources of bias, we would therefore 
expect standard estimates of φ  to understate the magnitude of social interaction effects, with the amount 
of bias determined by the extent that the residual variation in 2000iPeerDP  is due to the indirect 
spillovers from past shocks rather than the direct effect of recent shocks.  
 In light of these potential problems, non-IV estimators of φ  are unlikely to provide an unbiased 
estimate of the social interaction effect. Moreover, we have no way of knowing a priori whether positive 
or negative sources of bias will dominate.   
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4.2. Instrumental Variable Approach 
To address these numerous sources of bias, our approach for estimating φ  exploits recent and plausibly 
exogenous shocks affecting 2000iPeerDP . We can then identify social interaction effects by looking at 
how the shocks affecting a worker’s peers subsequently affect that worker’s likelihood of entering DP. 
Our strategy is similar to the “partial population intervention” approach advocated by Moffitt (2001). 
Our strategy specifically uses recent plant downsizing events to instrument for the DP 
participation rate of a worker’s peers ( 2000iPeerDP ). This strategy hinges on two facts about disability 
participation. First, plant downsizing is a strong predictor of a worker’s likelihood of entering disability in 
Norway, as previously established in Rege, Telle and Votruba (2007).13 Second, disability participation is 
“sticky,” in the sense that participants rarely exit the system.14 As a result, downsizing within peers’ 
plants of employment is expected to increase the entry rate of peers onto DP, and this effect persists over 
time even in the absence of social interaction effects. Provided that downsizing in peers’ plants of 
employment is independent of unobserved determinants of DP entry, the sources of positive bias 
discussed above would be alleviated. Our attention to recent shocks addresses the (negative) bias resulting 
from out-of-equilibrium changes in peer participation rates and randomness in the timing of DP entries.  
The logic underlying our IV strategy is fairly straightforward. The direct effect of plant 
downsizing on DP participation can be captured by inclusion of individual-level plant downsizing 
covariates. In the aggregate, peer groups disproportionately exposed to plant downsizing events will 
subsequently demonstrate an increase in DP participation relative to peer groups in which fewer peers 
experienced plant downsizing. If social interaction effects exist, we should observe a relative increase in 
DP entry among workers in disproportionately hit peer groups independent of a worker’s own downsizing 
experience. 
Operationally, we implement a two stage linear probability model (2SLS).15 The first stage 
equation predicts the DP participation rate among i’s peers at the end of 2000: 
(2) 0 1 2 3 42000i i i i i iPeerDP X N P PeerPDRβ β β β β ν= + + + + +  
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 See also Røed and Fevang (2007) and Huttunen, Møen and Salvanes (2006) for how downsizing and organizational change 
affect workforce participation. 
14
 Less than 1% per year (Annual Statistical Yearbook 2003, Norwegian National Insurance Administration). 
15
 Results for alternative specifications are also presented. 
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where iPeerPDR  is a vector characterizing the exposure of i’s peers to plant downsizing events between 
1995 and 1999.16 The second stage equation, modified from equation (1), predicts the likelihood that a 
worker who is employed in 1999 draws disability in 2003: 
(3) n0 1 2 32003 2000i i i i i iDP X N P PeerDPα α α α φ ε= + + + + +  
where n2000iPeerDP  is the predicted value of the peer DP participation rate from estimation of the first-
stage equation.  
Under the assumption that the plant downsizing experiences of a worker’s peers are independent 
of the unobservable determinants of DP entry, 2SLS will provide consistent estimation of φ . There are 
several reasons why this independence assumption may be problematic. First, peers’ plant downsizing 
experiences could be correlated with a worker’s own plant downsizing experience, either in the past or 
going forward. We address this concern through robustness tests, investigating whether our estimate is 
sensitive to inclusion of covariates capturing a worker’s past (1995-1999) and future (1999-2003) plant 
downsizing experiences. Second, local plant downsizing events may be correlated with a decline in 
economic opportunities or future job prospects even for individuals in non-downsizing plants. Again, we 
can test whether our estimate is sensitive to inclusion of variables meant to proxy for such things, such as 
changes in the local unemployment rate. Finally, plant downsizing may be concentrated in neighborhoods 
populated with persons having generally higher propensities to draw sickness-related benefits. If so, we 
would expect peer downsizing rates to be correlated with rates of sick money and DP use prior to the 
downsizing events. The richness of our data allows us to test this possibility as well. 
4.3.  Interpreting the Social Interaction Coefficient and Deriving the Social Mul-
tiplier 
Provided our empirical strategy allows enough time (four years) for each peer group to equilibrate from 
recent downsizing events, our IV approach provides a clean and policy relevant interpretation of the 
estimated social interaction coefficient φ  in terms of the social multiplier. To see this, suppose x fraction 
of a peer group is induced to enter DP as result of a recent (policy, economic, health or other) exogenous 
shock. Our estimate of φ  suggests that another ( )1x xφ −  share of the peer group will subsequently enter 
DP as a result of social interaction effects. Thus, the total effect of the shock is an increase in the DP rate 
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 We use peers’ DP rate in 2000 as our covariate of interest instead of the rate in 1999, as plant downsizing over 1995-1999 
is a stronger predictor of DP use in 2000 than in 1999. We attribute this to the lengthy application approval process as well as 
the possibility that responses to downsizing events might not be immediate.  
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within the group by ( )1x x xφ+ − . The social multiplier can therefore be estimated as ( )1 1 xφ+ − , 
reasonably approximated as 1 φ+  for sufficiently small shocks. 
 For completeness, we note two obvious problems with this estimate of the social multiplier. First, 
our results indicate that social interaction effects take longer to fully materialize than our estimation 
model (and data) allow. Second, it is conceivable that part of the social interaction effect materializes 
prior to 1999. In either case, we would expect φ  to be biased downwards. We therefore interpret our 
estimate of φ  (and the estimated social multiplier) as providing a lower bound on the social interaction 
effect in DP use. 
5. Dataset Description 
Our analysis utilizes a database provided by Statistics Norway called FD-trygd. FD-trygd includes a 
rich longitudinal dataset containing records for every Norwegian from 1992 to 2003. The variables 
captured in this dataset include individual demographic information (sex, age, marital status, number 
of children), socio-economic data (years of education, income, wealth), current employment status 
(full time, part time, minor part time, self-employed), industry of employment (if employed), 
indicators of participation in any of Norway’s welfare programs, and geographic identifiers for 
municipality and neighborhood of residence. 
 In addition, FD-trygd contains records for employment “events” since mid-1995. These 
events, captured by individual and date, include entry and exits into employment, changes in 
employment status (full time, part time, minor part time), and changes in plant and firm of 
employment. These employment events are constructed by data analysts at Statistics Norway from raw 
employment spell records submitted by employers, and verified against employee wage records (not 
available to us) to ensure the validity of each spell and to eliminate records pertaining to “secondary” 
employment spells.17    
 From these two data sources, four set of variables were created for use in our analysis, 
described below. The covariates used in our estimation models are described in greater detail in 
Appendix A. 
5.1. Plant Downsizing Variables  
Based on the employment records, we constructed plant-level employment counts at the end of years 
1995, 1999 and 2003. The counts were constructed as measures of full-time equivalents (FTEs), with 
                                                     
17
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part time and minor part time employment measured as 0.67 and 0.33 FTEs, respectively. Excluded 
from these counts were any persons identified in FD-trygd as self-employed or receiving assistance 
that should have precluded full time work (those receiving unemployment benefits, a rehabilitation 
pension or a disability pension). Plant-level FTEs were then used to construct measures of plant 
downsizing over two periods of time: from 1995 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2003. The measures, which 
we refer to as the “plant downsizing rate” (PDR), capture the percent decline in FTEs over the period. 
For instance, plants that fully closed over a given period were recorded as having a PDR=1 for that 
period; plants with FTE counts declining by 50 percent were recorded as having PDR=0.5. Plants that 
grew over a given period were recorded as PDR=0 for that period.  
 As our empirical strategy relies on the power of plant downsizing events to predict 
subsequent entry onto disability, we choose to focus on downsizing events in reasonably large plants. 
Specifically, the PDR variable was set to zero for workers employed in plants with fewer than 5 FTEs 
in the baseline year. Approximately 11 percent of workers were in plants of this size in 1995.  
5.2. Worker Sample and Characteristics 
Our analytic sample consists of native Norwegians age 45-63 employed either full time or part time in 
1999, and also employed full time or part time in 1995. We chose to focus on older workers since 
these demonstrate the highest rates of DP entry. The upward age limit was imposed to ensure that none 
of our sample would be eligible for the normal retirement pension in 2003.18 Excluded were any 
workers identified as self-employed or receiving assistance that should have precluded full time work 
(those receiving unemployment benefits, a rehabilitation pension or a disability pension), as well as 
any receiving social assistance. We excluded those employed in small plants (<5 FTEs) in 1999, for 
the purpose of controlling for the PDR of a worker’s current plant going forward (over 1999-2003). 
We also limited our sample to those residing in a neighborhood in 1995 that contained at least 10 
workers age 41-62 to ensure that each person in our sample had a reasonable number of “peers” under 
our definition of peer groups (discussed below). Finally, we omitted 907 workers who had received a 
disability pension any time between 1995 and 1999, as well as one worker missing income/wealth 
variables in 1999. The resulting dataset consists of 378,148 workers residing in 10,209 different 1995 
neighborhoods.   
 Variables capturing individual socio-economic characteristics were constructed based on 
records for 1999. These variables include age, sex, education, marital status, number of children, 
personal income, other household income, net household wealth and an indicator for receipt of a 
widow(er) pension. Employment-related variables include an indicator for part time status, tenure at 
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 The age of eligibility for the normal retirement pension is 67.  
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current firm, plant size in 1999, and fourteen industry indicators.19 The PDR of the worker’s 1999 
plant (1999-2003) was captured, as well as the past PDR (1995-1999) for the worker’s 1995 plant of 
employment. Personal income and household wealth in 1995 was also captured, allowing us to control 
for the effect of changes in the workers’ economic standing.   
 Our outcome of interest is an indicator variable capturing whether the worker received 
either temporary or permanent DP at the end of 2003, with the one caveat. For workers who died or 
emigrated prior to 2003 and those drawing an early retirement pension20 in 2003, the indicator was set 
to one if the worker had entered DP prior to the event occurring. In sum, 6.9 percent of our sample 
received DP in 2003 (or prior to the events described above). Summary statistics for the remaining 
individual-level variables are presented in Table 1 (panel A). 
5.3. Peer Groups and Characteristics  
As described in our empirical strategy, we define peer groups based on age, neighborhood of residence 
(in 1995) and employment status. Specifically, neighbors are included in a worker’s peer group if they 
were age 41-62 and employed full time or part time in 1995. The upward age limit was imposed to 
ensure that peers were not eligible for the normal retirement pension in 2000. We defined peer groups 
based on 1995 neighborhoods of residence in case local downsizing events influenced worker 
mobility. If so, defining peer groups based on 1999 neighborhood of residence could lead to 
estimation bias through neighborhood self-selection. 
Similar socio-economic and employment variables as those described for the worker sample 
were constructed at the peer group level, using records for 1995. Summary statistics for these 
characteristics are presented in Table 1 (panel B). Continuous variables were converted to categorical 
variables to create the peer-level covariates used in our estimation models. For instance, the age and 
sex composition of a worker’s peers was captured as the fraction of peers in 14 age-sex categories 
(three-year age intervals interacted with sex). Peers’ income and wealth were each captured as the 
fraction of peers in 6 categories defined based on the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles for the 
distribution of the relevant variable over the full sample of peers. Additional program participation 
variables were created for the fraction of peers on social assistance, receiving sick money at the end of 
1995 or having received sick money at any time in 1995.   
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 Coded based on major categories in the Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE), with 
certain categories combined due to small sample sizes (agriculture, hunting and forestry was combined with fishing; activities 
of households was combined with other community, social and personal service activities; extra-territorial organizations and 
bodies was combined with public administration and defense).  
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 In some firms, workers satisfying specific work history requirements can qualify for an early retirement pension (AFP) at 
age 62. 
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Peer level PDR variables were created based on the level of downsizing in each peer’s plant 
over 1995-1999. Four peer-level PDR variables were constructed capturing the fraction of peers 
employed (in 1995) in plants downsizing 10-30, 30-60, 60-100 and 100 percent.21 These categories 
were found in Rege, Telle and Votruba (2007) to capture the individual-level effects of downsizing in 
a reasonably parsimonious way.  
Finally, the DP rate of each worker’s peers was constructed as the fraction of peers on 
permanent or temporary DP in 2000. As in the worker sample, we included in this fraction any peers 
who received DP prior to dying, emigrating or drawing an early retirement pension in 2000. Over our 
sample of workers, the mean participation rate of the workers’ peer groups was 7.4 percent in 2000.   
5.4. Other Municipal and Neighborhood Level Characteristics  
We created additional variables to capture characteristics of the 1995 municipality and neighborhood 
of residence thought to potentially influence DP entry behavior. These include total native population; 
fraction of immigrants; fraction of natives age <18, 18-41 and ≥62 years old; mean income and 
wealth; and unemployment rate.22 Additional variables capture the fraction of neighborhood and 
municipality residents, age 41-62 in 1995, in nine mutually exclusive “status” categories: receives 
permanent disability, receives temporary disability, receives rehabilitation pension, receives day 
money (unemployment), unemployed without receiving day money, self-employed, employed full 
time, employed part time, employed minor part time.23 Summary statistics for these variables are 
presented in Table 1 (panel C). 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1. Preliminary First Stage Results  
As discussed in Section 4, our IV strategy hinges on the fact that plant downsizing events affect 
individual DP entry, so that peers’ exposure to downsizing can be used to predict the DP entry rate of 
one’s peers. The individual-level effect of downsizing on DP entry was previously demonstrated in 
Rege, Telle and Votruba (2007), which also found substantial variation in this effect across industries. 
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 Formally, the ranges of each downsizing category are [10%, 30%), [30%, 60%), [60%, 100%), and [100%], with the last 
category capturing full closures. 
22
 The income, wealth and unemployment rate variables were calculated over natives age 22-67.  For calculating the 
unemployment rate, the “employed” were counted as those working full time or part time, and the “unemployed” were 
counted as those neither working nor self-employed and having received unemployment benefits or registered as “looking for 
work” in the past year.  
23
 A tenth (omitted) status category consists of persons neither employed nor receiving DP, rehabilitation pension or day 
money. We distinguish between this group and those “unemployed without receiving day money” based on whether the 
individual had registered as “looking for work” in the past year.     
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For the purpose of specifying our first-stage model, we therefore allow the effect of peers’ downsizing 
exposure to vary depending on the industry of the “exposed” peers.  
Table 2, Panel A reports linear (OLS) estimates of the effect of peers’ exposure to downsizing 
events on the peer DP rate in 2000 over workers in our sample, analogous to our first stage model 
(equation 2). Each PDR covariate in the model (56 total) reflects the fraction of a worker’s peers 
employed in a particular industry in 1995 whose plant of employment downsized the given magnitude 
by 1999. Covariates capturing the individual, peer, neighborhood and municipal characteristics in 
Table 1 are included in this and all subsequent models.24 Of particular note, a set of 56 covariates 
captures the fraction of one’s peers employed in plants of a particular industry and size.25  
While the majority of the estimated PDR coefficients in the first stage model are positive (see 
Table 2), there is substantial variation in these estimates. Twenty-one of the estimates are actually 
negative in sign, with one of these (marginally) significant.26 The aggregate predictive power of the 
PDR covariates is quite low, producing an F-statistic of 2.29. As a result, including the full set of PDR 
covariates in the instrument set raises a well-known set of “weak instrument” problems.27 First, IV 
estimates based on the full set of potential instruments are expected to suffer from “finite sample bias” 
towards the OLS estimate. Second, the asymptotic assumptions underlying conventional hypothesis 
testing break down in the face of weak instruments, leading conventional standard errors to exaggerate 
precision of IV estimates. Third, if the instruments are not entirely exogenous, the expected bias is 
more severe when instruments are weak. Thus, potential failures of the identifying assumption are of 
greater concern when instruments are weak.  
6.2. The Weak Instruments Problem and Alternative 2SLS Estimates  
While asymptotic efficiency is obtained from including all valid instruments, the finite sample 
properties of IV estimates can be improved by selectively excluding valid instruments with weak 
power (Stock, Wright and Yogo, 2002). A number of “instrument selection” procedures have been 
suggested in the econometrics literature as means for addressing the weak instruments problem (e.g. 
Hall and Peixe 2002; Donald and Newey 2001), though a standard method has yet to emerge. For our 
analysis, we adopted a procedure to select among the set of potential instruments along the lines 
suggested by Donald and Newey (2001). Specifically, we sought to exclude potential instruments 
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 See Appendix A for further details regarding the included covariates. 
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 Doing so addresses potential bias arising from the fact that we do not capture downsizing outcomes for peers originally 
employed in small plants.   
26
 The PDR covariates demonstrating small or negative coefficients in the first stage model are generally those demonstrating 
smaller effects in similar models estimated at the individual level (see Rege, Telle and Votruba 2007). 
27
 These problems are nicely surveyed by Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002). See also Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995), Staiger 
and Stock (1997), and Hahn and Hausman (2003) for important contributions to this literature.  
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when their inclusion increased the mean square error around the IV estimate, the criteria employed by 
Donald and Newey.  
Following Donald and Newey, we constructed a sequence of candidate instrument sets {ZK}, 
where K={1, 2, .., 56} denotes the number of PDR covariates in each set. The set Z1 consists solely of 
the PDR covariate with the largest marginal R2 contribution to the first stage regression (conditional 
on the other covariates). Each subsequent set, ZK+1, consists of the PDR covariates in ZK, as well as 
one additional PDR covariate determined by the covariate with the largest marginal R2 contribution to 
the first stage regression (conditional on ZK and the other covariates). Thus, each ZK set roughly 
consists of the K potential instruments providing the greatest power in the first stage.28   
The results from these alternative models were used to calculate the approximate finite-sample 
bias in the 2SLS estimator and the asymptotic variance around the estimator, from which the 
approximate mean square error was calculated. The formulas for doing so are presented in Appendix 
B. As shown in Figure 2, the approximate finite sample bias is negative in sign and growing in 
magnitude as weaker instruments are included in the instrument set. The 2SLS estimates produced 
using alternative instrument sets roughly coincide with the approximate bias. Together, these results 
suggest that, corrected for finite sample bias, our instruments generally produce estimates of φ  of 
about 0.61. 
Figure 2 presents 2SLS estimates of φ  under alternative instrument sets {ZK} for values of 
K≥4. The 2SLS estimates range in magnitude from 0.61 when a restrictive set of instruments (K=6) is 
employed down to roughly 0.45 when fuller sets of peer downsizing covariates are included as 
instruments (K≥40). While not monotonic, the 2SLS estimates decline in a fairly linear fashion as 
progressively weaker instruments are added, consistent with finite sample bias towards a smaller OLS 
estimate.  
Figure 3 plots the approximate mean square error associated with 2SLS estimates under 
alternative instrument sets. As progressively weaker instruments are added to the model, the bias of 
the 2SLS estimator increases but the asymptotic variance around the estimator decreases. Thus, in 
choosing among candidate instrument sets, we are essentially choosing between estimators that are 
less biased but less precise versus those that are more biased but more precise. Our calculations 
indicate that the approximate mean squared error around the 2SLS estimator is minimized when the 
Z14 instrument set is employed. For the remainder of our analysis, we therefore concentrate on IV 
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 Due to the large number of potential instruments, an exact application of Donald and Newey’s approach was not attempted 
and our approach varies in a number of respects. First, due to the large number of candidate instruments, we required that the 
sequence of candidate instrument sets be nested in one another (i.e. Z1⊂ Z2 ⊂ … ⊂ Z56). Second, alternative sets of 
instruments were constructed based solely on the power contributed by a candidate instrument in the first stage, rather than 
grouping potential instruments for a priori reasons.   
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results using as instruments the 14 peer PDR covariates demonstrating the greatest power in predicting 
the peer DP rate in 2000.    
Panel B of Table 2 presents OLS coefficients from the first stage model using our preferred set 
of instruments (K=14). The exclusion of weaker instruments from this model, cf. Panel A of Table 2, 
had only a modest effect on the coefficients for the included instruments. While the F-statistic (7.07) is 
substantially larger than that produced using the full set of instruments (2.29), it fails to reach levels 
where the weak instrument problem can be safely ignored (Staiger and Stock 1997). Thus, IV 
estimates under our preferred instrument set are still expected to suffer (modest) finite sample bias 
towards the OLS estimate, and conventional standard errors potentially understate the true variance 
around these estimates.  
6.3. Main Results 
The main results from our analysis are presented in Table 3. For comparison purposes, the first two 
columns report non-IV estimates of the social interaction effect. Estimated under a linear probability 
specification via OLS (column 1), our estimate suggests a one percent increase in the 2000 peer DP 
rate predicts a modest 0.07 percentage point increase in the subsequent entry rate (to 2003) of workers 
employed at the end of 1999. A probit specification produced mean marginal effect estimates about 20 
percent smaller. Consistent with our previous discussion, the non-IV estimates of φ  are much smaller 
than the alternative 2SLS estimates in Figure 2. Thus, the potential positive bias resulting from 
correlated unobservables within groups appears to be dominated by the negative bias arising from 
dynamic aspects of our model (i.e. randomness in the timing of DP entries and the equilibration of 
peer DP rates from past shocks). Put another way, our estimate of φ  increases substantially when 
specifically identified off of recent shocks to the peer DP rate.  
Columns 3-6 provide various IV estimates employing our preferred instrument set. Our 2SLS 
estimate is the same as that depicted visually in Figure 2 (for K=14) and suggests that a one percentage 
point increase in the 2000 peer DP rate due to recent downsizing events increases the subsequent entry 
rate (1999-2003) of workers by 0.5 percentage points, an 7.2 percent increase relative to the aggregate 
rate of entry. Estimating our IV model using limited information maximum likelihood (LIML)29 had 
little effect on our estimate (see column 4), as did estimation using two-step feasible generalized 
method of moments (results not shown). Employing Nagar’s (1959) bias-corrected 2SLS model, the 
estimated φ increases about 12 percent. Across each of these specifications, standard tests of 
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 LIML estimators are known to be less biased that 2SLS but suffer from larger small sample variation (Hahn, Hausman and 
Kuersteiner, 2004). 
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overidentifying restrictions passed easily. In an IV-Probit specification, the estimated mean marginal 
effect is about 13 percent smaller than suggested by the linear models. 
As mentioned earlier, the conventional standard errors reported for our IV estimates should be 
interpreted with caution as they potentially overstate the precision of our estimates due to the 
weakness of our instruments. To evaluate the extent of this problem, we compared the conventional 
confidence interval around our 2SLS estimate to that calculated using the “conditional likelihood 
ratio” approach developed by Moreira (2003).30 There was very little difference between the two 
confidence intervals when evaluated at either the 95 percent or 99 percent levels, suggesting that the 
conventional standard errors provide a reasonably accurate gauge of estimate precision. 
For comparison, columns 7-10 report IV results using the full set of peer PDR covariates as 
instruments. As anticipated by Figure 2, the 2SLS, LIML and IV-Probit estimates are modestly 
smaller than before, a result consistent with increasing finite sample bias, while the bias-corrected 
2SLS estimate is somewhat larger. Tests of overidentifying restrictions fail in each of these models, 
another reason we concentrate on the findings using our preferred instrument set.   
6.4. Robustness Tests 
The identifying assumption in our IV approach is that the plant downsizing experiences of a worker’s 
peers occur independently of unobserved determinants of DP participation. Table 4 presents the results 
of robustness checks to test the validity of this assumption. For comparison, results from our 2SLS 
model (Table 3, column 3) are repeated in column 1. 
An important concern for our identifying assumption is that exposure to downsizing is correlated 
across peers, who are frequently employed in the same plants. As a result, our IV estimate could reflect a 
delayed reaction to one’s own downsizing experience. If so, controlling for the past PDR (over 1995-
1999) in workers’ 1995 plants would be expected to reduce the estimated social interaction coefficient.31 
As indicated in column 2, controlling for the past PDR of workers’ 1995 plants has negligible impact on 
the 2SLS estimate, despite adding significant power to the model (p<.0001 for F test of joint 
significance).   
Peers’ downsizing events could also be indicative of declining local labor market conditions, 
which could influence disability entry going forward, biasing our estimate upwards. Columns 3-5 include 
additional covariates expected to capture changes in a worker’s labor market conditions. In column 3, we 
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 For the purposes of this comparison, the model was estimated under the assumption of independent, homoskedastic errors. 
As currently available in Stata®, the conditional likelihood ratio test statistics can only be calculated under this assumption. 
Murray (2006) cites Moreira’s approach as “state of the art for hypothesis testing with weak instruments” (p126).       
31
 Similar to the PDR instruments, the individual covariates for own plant downsizing rate consist of interactions of the four 
PDR categories with industry (56 dummies variables).    
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include covariates capturing the PDR of the worker’s 1999 plant going forward (over 1999-2003). In 
column 4, we include covariates capturing changes in the workers’ personal income and household wealth 
since 1995. In column 5, we add county indicators32 and covariates capturing the 1999 unemployment 
rate and mean income in each workers’ 1995 neighborhood and municipality. Each additional set of 
covariates contributes significant power to the model (p<.0001), but has negligible effect on the 2SLS 
estimate with the exception of the last, when the estimate increases modestly.  
The remaining robustness checks address the concern that our measure of downsizing is a fairly 
crude measure of individual workers’ exposure to employment shocks. Workers who switched plants over 
1995-1999 are a particular concern in this regard, since they may have been exposed to downsizing in 
their subsequent plants, or may have been laid off from a plant that subsequently increased employment. 
Column 6 therefore estimates the 2SLS model excluding workers who switched plants. Column 7 reflects 
an even more conservative approach, restricting the sample to non-switchers in stable or growing plants 
over 1995-1999. We perceive this last model as a particularly strong test of social interaction effects, 
since the sample excludes all workers directly affected by the downsizing shocks used to identify our 
estimate. Interestingly, the 2SLS estimate increases somewhat in magnitude when plant switchers are 
excluded, perhaps reflecting that social interaction effects are stronger for workers with more stable 
employment. Indeed, it seems reasonable to think that “stable” workers might have stronger social ties to 
their neighbors, though we have no way of confirming this. Further restricting our sample to those in 
stable or growing plants had only a small effect on our estimate. Therefore, it seems unlikely that our 
estimate reflects a bias from unobserved past employment shocks that are correlated with the peer 
downsizing instruments.   
6.5. Specification Tests 
In this section, we explore the possibility that variation in pre-existing unobservables is potentially 
correlated with the variation in 2000iPeerDP  explained by our instruments. We primarily have two 
unobservables in mind, which could be labeled broadly as “propensity for work” and “propensity for 
drawing disability-related benefits.” For instance, if workers with lower propensities for work are those 
with peers disproportionately exposed to downsizing events, this would bias IV estimates of the social 
interaction effect upwards. A number of plausible stories could lead to such a bias. Downsizing events 
might be concentrated in areas with generally poorer employment opportunities or in areas where 
attachment to the labor force is generally weaker. Alternatively, since workers sort themselves into 
neighborhoods for reasons not entirely observable, workers with weaker attachment to the labor force 
might self-select neighborhoods where plant-employment patterns are less stable. Similar stories could be 
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told that would lead to correlation between the explained variation in 2000iPeerDP  and the unobserved 
propensity for drawing disability benefits. 
In the following specification tests, we use observed outcomes prior to 1995 to proxy for the 
unobservable propensities for work and for drawing disability-related benefits, and estimate the “effect” 
of 2000iPeerDP  on these outcomes. A significant coefficient represents a potential source of bias.  
Table 5 presents two sets of results in this regard. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates for the “effect” 
of 2000iPeerDP  on the probability a worker in our sample is employed full- or part-time at the end of 
each calendar year. Panel B reports analogous estimates for the probability of receiving sick money at the 
end of each year. Concentrating on results prior to 1995, downsizing-induced changes in 2000iPeerDP  
are positively correlated with labor force attachment and (weakly) negatively correlated with sick money 
use. As a result, we might expect our IV estimates to suffer from a negative bias. Notably, these 
relationships change signs after 1999. In particular, we find a strong significant effect of 2000iPeerDP  
on sick money use after 1999, consistent with the emergence of a negative effect of peers’ downsizing 
exposure on workers’ willingness to takeup sickness-related benefits. One troubling finding in Table 5 is 
the marginally significant “effect” of 2000iPeerDP  on employment in 1997. This finding could 
potentially reflect declining labor market opportunities among workers in peer groups disproportionately 
exposed to downsizing. However, if this were a serious source of bias, we would have expected our 
estimate to decline under the sample restrictions discussed above (Table 4, columns 6 and 7). 
A potential problem with the specification tests presented in Table 5 is that the observed 
outcomes relate specifically to our sample of workers, who were required to be employed in both 1995 
and 1999. As a result, variation in local labor market conditions or in worker tastes might not be captured 
in the outcomes for this select sample. To address this concern, Table 6 reports the results from similar 
specifications employing neighborhood-level outcomes. Specifically, we report 2SLS estimates for the 
“effect” of 2000iPeerDP  on DP and labor force participation rates in a worker’s neighborhood prior to 
1995. Importantly, these rates are based on the entire population of similarly-aged persons residing in the 
worker’s 1995 neighborhood, not the subset of employed neighbors used to define peer groups. Also, we 
exclude as covariates from these models the neighborhood-level covariates capturing the fraction of 
neighbors in different employment and program use categories since these are collinear with the 
outcomes being modeled. As reported in Table 6, we find no evidence that unexplained pre-existing 
differences in neighborhood rates of employment or DP use are correlated with the variation in 
2000iPeerDP  explained by our instruments.    
Taking together, these results fail to indicate that pre-existing differences across individuals or 
neighborhoods present a serious source of bias in our estimation of social interaction effects. 
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6.6. Disability Pension Entry to Alternative Endpoints 
While our social interaction estimate is robust to inclusion of covariates intended to capture changing 
conditions in the local labor market (Table 4, columns 3-5), these covariates fail to fully capture workers’ 
perceptions regarding the local labor market. Workers in neighborhoods disproportionately affected by 
downsizing events could form poor impressions of their labor market opportunities, triggering an 
increased rate of DP entry by such workers, biasing our IV estimate upwards. Unfortunately, we have no 
way of directly testing whether peers’ exposure to downsizing events affects workers’ perceptions in this 
way. 
As an indirect test, Table 7 presents 2SLS estimates of the social interaction effect altering the 
“endpoint” at which DP use is measured. If our IV estimate merely reflects workers’ response to the 
psychological shock of observing local downsizing events, we would expect the DP entry responses to be 
fairly contemporaneous with the occurrence of those downsizing events. That is, we would expect the 
social interaction coefficient to “level off” rather quickly. Instead, we find no evidence that the DP effect 
has “leveled off” by 2003. While this result does not preclude a potential “psychological effect” bias, it 
does undermine the argument that our estimate is merely an artifact of this bias. Moreover, since the 
social interaction coefficient increases substantially over the last year for which we have data, this 
suggests that our estimate likely understates the full magnitude of the effect that would be observed in 
equilibrium. 
7. Conclusion   
In this paper we estimate the magnitude of social interaction effects in disability pension participation 
among older workers in Norway. Specifically, we investigate how workers’ propensity to draw DP 
benefits is affected by the disability participation of their “peers,” defined as neighbors of similar age 
and employment status. To address issues of omitted variable bias, we use peers’ exposure to plant 
downsizing events to instrument for peer rates of DP entry. To our knowledge, this is the first study to 
examine social interaction effects in disability participation.  
Our linear probability estimates suggest that a one percentage point increase in the DP 
participation rate of previously employed neighbors increased the subsequent 4-year entry rate of 
employed workers by about 0.5 percentage points. Our non-linear (probit) IV estimate is somewhat 
smaller (0.44 percentage points), but remains large and highly significant. Moreover, several factors 
would suggest that our estimate is a lower bound on the magnitude of the social interaction effect. 
First, the relatively low power of our instruments contributes to finite sample bias towards the lower 
OLS estimate, as evidenced by our larger bias-corrected estimate. Second, we are able to follow 
workers for only a limited time following the downsizing events used to identify our estimate. Given 
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the substantial increase in the social interaction coefficient when DP use is measured to 2003 versus 
2002, it is doubtful that peer rates of DP participation have fully equilibrated from the identifying 
shocks by 2003. Related to this, part of the social interaction effect is conceivably experienced prior to 
1999, which would effectively reduce our IV estimate since DP entrants prior to 1999 are eliminated 
from our sample workers.  
The causal interpretation of our social interaction estimate depends critically on the 
assumption that peers’ exposure to downsizing events is independent of unobservable determinants of 
disability entry. Ex ante, one might reasonably expect downsizing events to be concentrated in 
neighborhoods with workers having higher pre-existing propensities for entering disability. However, 
we find no evidence that the variance in peer DP rates induced by peers’ exposure to plant downsizing 
events is associated with the neighborhood rate of DP use prior to the downsizing events. Workers in 
peer groups disproportionately exposed to downsizing have higher rates of employment and lower 
rates of sick money use prior to the downsizing events suggesting, if anything, our estimate is bias 
downwards. 
Alternatively, local downsizing events could adversely affect local labor market conditions, 
causing a rise in disability entry rates independent of any social interaction effect. Our robustness tests 
fail to provide support for such a bias. While we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that our 
estimate is contaminated by the psychological effect of observing local downsizing events, our 
estimates of the social interaction effect to different points in time shed doubt on this as a major source 
of bias. 
Our results suggest that 1.5 provides a reasonable lower-bound estimate of the social 
multiplier in disability participation when measured at the level of Norwegian neighborhoods. As 
demonstrated in Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2003), the level of aggregation can greatly affect 
the size of estimated social multipliers. Moreover, Norway has a particularly homogeneous 
population, which could contribute to especially large social interaction effects. Nonetheless, our 
results suggest a social multiplier similar in magnitude to those estimated by Glaeser, Sacerdote and 
Scheinkman (2003) in college dorm rates of fraternity membership and county-level crime rates.  
The large magnitude of social interaction effects has important implications for research in 
disability insurance participation. Social interaction effects could conceivably explain the large 
variation in SSDI participation across U.S. counties (McCoy et al. 1994). They could conceivably 
contribute to the sizable labor supply response to disability benefit increases observed in Canada 
(Gruber 2000), as well as the large SSDI response to the coal boom/bust observed in coal-producing 
states (Black et al. 2002). To the extent that social networks are defined along socio-economic lines, 
they could help explain the large increase in disability participation among low-skilled U.S. workers, 
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attributed in Autor and Duggan (2003) to the declining demand for low-skilled workers and an 
unforeseen increase in their disability benefit replacement rates. As a general empirical matter, the 
existence of large social interaction effects requires careful interpretation of estimates meant to capture 
the individual-level determinants of disability participation to the extent these determinants are 
concentrated within a particular social network. Such estimates likely exaggerate the individual-level 
importance of such determinants but under-estimate the full (aggregate) effect. 
For policy-makers, our results lend empirical support to concerns about the potential 
development of welfare cultures arising from poorly designed disability insurance programs. From a 
social welfare perspective, the existence of large social interactions could dramatically affect estimates 
of the “optimal” earnings replacement rate, an issue that has received little attention in the program 
design literature.33 The existence of social interaction effects would also strengthen arguments made 
by Autor and Duggan (2006) regarding the importance of developing screening procedures that 
minimize potential abuse of disability insurance programs. Finally, our results indicate that efforts to 
reduce the impact of economic shocks on disability entry (e.g. retraining programs, job search 
assistance) would, if effective, also reduce disability participation among persons not directly affected 
by those shocks.   
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 Bound et al. (2004) provides a useful framework for evaluating the social welfare implications of disability benefit 
changes, but does not explicitly address the role of social interaction effects.   
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Appendix A 
Covariate Details 
The table below describes the exact covariates included our estimation models. 
 
Panel A: Individual-level characteristics (in 1999 unless otherwise indicated) 
Characteristic Covariates Analyses Comments 
sex/age 
indicator for female, plus 
third-order polynomial of age 
interested with sex 
all  
personal income third-order polynomial all 
includes all non-capital 
sources of income, including 
government transfers  
other household income third-order polynomial all total household income net of personal income 
household wealth third-order polynomial all  
education indicators for education ≤9, 13-15, and ≥16 years  all 
missing assigned to omitted 
category (10-12 years) 
marital status indicators for married, 
widowed, and divorced all 
missing assigned to omitted 
category (single) 
number of children indicators for 1, 2-3, and ≥4 all 
number reflects count of 
persons <18 years old in 
household 
receives widow(er) 
pension indicator  all  
employed part-time  indicator all  
tenure at plant indicators for 1-3, 3-5, and ≥5 years all  
1999 plant industry/size 
indicators for plant industry 
(14 categories) and size (3 
categories: 5-25, 25-100, and 
≥100 FTEs)  
all 
42 total, one omitted due to 
colinearity; sample excludes 
those in (1999) plants 
employing <5 FTEs  
1999 plant industry/PDR 
indicators for plant industry 
(14 categories) and 1999-
2003 PDR (4 categories: 10-
30%, 30-60%, 60-100%, and 
100%) 
Table 4, (3)-(7) 56 total 
1995 plant industry/size 
 
  
indicators for plant industry 
and size (4 categories: <5, 5-
25, 25-100, and ≥100 FTEs) 
Table 4, (2)-(7) 56 total, one omitted due to 
colinearity 
1995 plant industry/PDR 
indicators for plant industry 
(14 categories) and 1995-99 
PDR (4 categories: 10-30%, 
30-60%, 60-100%, and 
100%)  
Table 4, (2)-(7) 56 total, set to zero if workers’ 1995 plant employed <5 FTEs 
∆income/wealth, 1995-99 
third-order polynomials for 
changes in personal income, 
other household income, and 
household wealth 
Table 4, (4)-(7)  
 
30 
Panel B: Peer group characteristics (in 1995) 
Characteristic Covariates Analyses Comments 
sex/age 
fraction of peers in 14 sex-age 
categories (age categories: 41-
44, 44-47, … , 59-62)  
all 14 total, one omitted due to 
colinearity 
education 
fraction of peers in three 
categories: ≤9, 13-15, and 
≥16 years of education 
all  
marital status 
fraction of peers in three 
categories: married, widowed, 
and divorced 
all  
number of children 
fraction of peers in three 
categories:  
1, 2-3, and ≥4 children in 
household 
all  
receives widow(er) 
pension fraction of peers receiving  all  
receives sick money fraction of peers receiving all  
received sick money in 
year 
fraction of peers who received 
earlier in year (but not at end 
of year) 
all  
receives social assistance fraction of peers receiving all  
personal income 
fraction of peers in six 
categories, defined by 10th, 
25th, 50th, 75th and 90th 
percentile in sample 
distribution   
all one omitted due to colinearity 
other household income 
fraction of peers in six 
categories, defined by 10th, 
25th, 50th, 75th and 90th 
percentile in sample 
distribution   
all one omitted due to colinearity 
household wealth 
fraction of peers in six 
categories, defined by 10th, 
25th, 50th, 75th and 90th 
percentile in sample 
distribution   
all one omitted due to colinearity 
employed part-time fraction of peers all  
tenure fraction of peers with ≥1 year 
of tenure in 1995 plant all  
1995 plant industry/size 
fraction of peers in 56 plant 
industry/ 
size categories (defined same 
as in Panel A) 
all one omitted due to colinearity 
1995 plant industry/PDR 
fraction of peers in 56 plant 
industry/ 
PDR categories (defined same 
as in Panel A) 
-- 
defines full set of potential 
instruments 
total count of peers second-order polynomial all see text for definition 
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Panel C: Neighborhood-level characteristics (in 1995 unless otherwise indicated) 
Characteristic Covariates Analyses Comments 
total population  total population  total population  total population  
fraction of immigrants fraction of immigrants fraction of immigrants fraction of immigrants 
Age Age Age Age 
mean personal income mean personal income mean personal income mean personal income 
mean other household 
inc mean other household inc 
mean other 
household inc mean other household inc 
mean household wealth mean household wealth mean household 
wealth mean household wealth 
unemployment rate unemployment rate unemployment rate unemployment rate 
employment/program 
statusa 
employment/program 
statusa 
employment/program 
statusa employment/program status
a
 
1999 unemployment 
rate 1999 unemployment rate 
1999 unemployment 
rate 1999 unemployment rate 
1999 mean personal 
income 1999 mean personal income 
1999 mean personal 
income 1999 mean personal income 
1999 “small” 
neighborhood 1999 “small” neighborhood 
1999 “small” 
neighborhood 1999 “small” neighborhood 
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Panel D: Municipal-level characteristics (in 1995 unless otherwise indicated) 
Characteristic Covariates Analyses Comments 
total population  total population  total population  total population  
fraction of immigrants fraction of immigrants fraction of 
immigrants 
fraction of immigrants 
Age Age Age Age 
mean personal income mean personal income mean personal 
income 
mean personal income 
mean other household 
inc 
mean other household inc mean other 
household inc 
mean other household inc 
mean household wealth mean household wealth mean household 
wealth 
mean household wealth 
unemployment rate unemployment rate unemployment rate unemployment rate 
employment/program 
statusa 
employment/program 
statusa 
employment/program 
statusa 
employment/program statusa 
1999 unemployment 
rate 
1999 unemployment rate 1999 unemployment 
rate 
1999 unemployment rate 
1999 mean personal 
income 
1999 mean personal income 1999 mean personal 
income 
1999 mean personal income 
county county county county 
a For the purpose of creating the “employment/program status” covariates, all natives age 41-62 in 
1995 were assigned to one of nine mutually exclusive categories, defined as: 
• receiving permanent DP 
• receiving temporary DP 
• receiving rehabilitation pension 
• receiving day money (unemployment benefits) 
• self-employed 
• employed full-time 
• employed part-time 
• employed minor part-time  
• unemployed (without receiving day money)    
 
The “unemployed” category captures persons neither currently employed nor receiving day money, 
but who were registered with the government as seeking employment in the past year. Thus, it is 
intended to capture those who are likely still in the workforce. (This group was combined with the 
“receiving day money” group for the purpose of constructing unemployment rate variables.) To ensure 
that the status categories were mutually exclusive, statuses were assigned in a stepwise fashion, such 
that assignment to an “earlier” category precluded assignment to a latter category (with the categories 
ordered as listed above).  
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Appendix B 
Calculating Approximate Bias and MSE 
The following describes the formulas used for calculating the approximate bias and mean squared 
error (MSE) around the 2SLS estimates presented in Figure 2. Similar representations for these 
formulas exist in the literature, although these are often expressed for cases where the second stage 
model includes a single endogenous covariate.34 These formulas have been modified to accommodate 
the presence of exogenous covariates and clustering of the error terms within neighborhood. Our 
notation follows that of Wooldridge (2002). 
For a given instrument set (K), the MSE around the 2SLS estimate can be written as: 
(B1) ( ) ( ) ( )( )22 2 2ˆ ˆ ˆK SLS K SLS K SLSMSE Var Biasβ β β= +  
or, more succinctly,  
 ( )2K K KMSE Var Bias= +  
where VarK  denotes the variance around the 2SLS estimator and BiasK denotes the finite sample bias. 
Following Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995), the finite sample bias in the 2SLS estimator can 
be approximated as: 
(B2) 
2
1
( 2)
K N
iK
i
K
Bias
r
ενσ
=
−
≈
∑
 
where ενσ  denotes the covariance between the second stage and first stage residuals and riK denotes 
the expected change in the predicted value of PeerDP2000i induced by the included covariates. 
(B3) ( ) ( )2000 , 2000iK i iK ir E PeerDP X Z E PeerDP X= − . 
An estimate of riK can be derived as the residual from the regression of ˆ2000iKPeerDP , the 
predicted value employing instrument set K, on the exogeneous covariates: 
(B4) ˆˆ ˆ2000iK K i iKPeerDP X rδ= + . 
The denominator in (B2) can therefore be estimated as sum of squared residuals from (B4). 
                                                     
34
 E.g. Hahn, Hausman and Kuersteiner (2004). 
34 
To estimate the numerator, an estimate of ενσ  can be calculated in typical fashion based on 
the estimated residuals from the first and second stage models. In our calculations, we estimate ενσ  
based on the K=56 model (full instrument set), holding this value constant for alternative K, in line 
with the procedure recommended Donaldson and Newey (2001). In doing so, differences in the 
approximate bias across different (K) estimators are driven entirely by differences in the number of 
instruments employed and the explanatory power of those instruments. 
The variance around the 2SLS estimator is approximated by an estimate of its asymptotic 
variance. Adjusting for within-neighborhood clustering, 
(B5) m
2
1
2
2
1
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
jN
i iK
j i j
K
N
iK
i
r
Var
r
ε
= ∈
=
   
≈    
∑ ∑
∑
 
Again, the estimated second stage residuals ( )ˆiε  were derived from the K=56 model and held constant 
across alternative models, so that differences in the estimated estimator variance across models is 
primarily the result of differences in the predictive power afforded by different instrument sets.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Empirical Strategy Timeline 
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Figure 2: 2SLS Estimates under Alternative Instrument Sets 
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Figure 3: Approximate Mean Square Error of 2SLS Estimates 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Panel A:  Worker Characteristics (1999)a 
Characteristic Fraction/Mean (s.d.) Characteristic Fraction/Mean (s.d.) 
2003 DP utilizationb 0.069 Industry  
Age 52.69 (4.715)    agriculture, fishing   0.004 
Female 0.423    mining, oil 0.022 
Education (years)     manufacturing 0.171 
   ≤9 yrs 0.133    electric, gas, water 0.017 
  13-15 yrs  0.318    construction 0.055 
   ≥16 yrs 0.195    wholesale/retail trade 0.106 
Marital status     hotels, restaurants 0.010 
   married 0.726    transport, communic. 0.089 
   widowed 0.024    financial intermed. 0.040 
   divorced 0.138    real estate, business 0.068 
Children <18 y.o.     public admin, defense 0.112 
   1 0.268    education 0.136 
   2-3 0.265    health, social work 0.144 
   ≥4 0.012    other services 0.026 
On widow(er) pension 0.015 1999-2003 PDRc  
Income/wealth     10-30% 0.168 
   personal income 315969 (169671)    30-60% 0.108 
   other HH income 279240 (586291)    60-100%  0.134 
   net HH wealth 320633 (2881228)    100% 0.060 
Emp status: PT 0.089 1995-1999 PDRd  
Tenure     10-30% 0.185 
   1-3 yrs 0.208    30-60% 0.076 
   3-5 yrs 0.160    60-100%  0.127 
   ≥5 yrs 0.579    100% 0.075 
Plant size (FTEs)  1995 Income/wealth  
   5-25 0.231    personal income 258467 (126669) 
   25-100 0.267    other HH income 222348 (285368) 
   ≥100 0.318    net HH wealth 141959 (2616800) 
a Characteristics measured at end of 1999 unless otherwise indicated. 
b Includes workers entering DP prior to death, emigrating, or drawing early retirement. 
c Measures decline in employment (FTEs) in worker’s 1999 plant of employment.   
d Measures decline in employment (FTEs) in worker’s 1995 plant of employment, set to zero for plants 
with fewer than 5 FTEs in 1995. 
38 
Table 1: Summary Statistics (cont.) 
Panel B:  Peer Group Characteristics (1995)a 
Characteristic Fraction/Mean (s.d.) Characteristic Fraction/Mean (s.d.) 
2000 DP rateb 0.074 (0.045) Plant size (FTEs)  
Age 49.75 (1.343)    5-25 0.248 (0.094) 
Female 0.434 (0.070)    25-100 0.282 (0.087) 
Education (years)  
   ≥100 0.359 (0.142) 
   ≤9 yrs 0.163 (0.091) Industry  
  13-15 yrs  0.286 (0.081)    agriculture, fishing   0.006 (0.018) 
   ≥16 yrs 0.171 (0.102)    mining, oil 0.019 (0.035) 
Marital status     manufacturing 0.167 (0.108) 
   married 0.744 (0.145)    electric, gas, water 0.015 (0.026) 
   widowed 0.021 (0.021)    construction 0.051 (0.041) 
   divorced 0.124 (0.080)    wholesale/retail trade 0.136 (0.063) 
Children <18 y.o.     hotels, restaurants 0.013 (0.020) 
   1 0.193 (0.076)    transport, communic. 0.085 (0.052) 
   2-3 0.154 (0.082)    financial intermed. 0.036 (0.029) 
   ≥4 0.007 (0.015)    real estate, business 0.065 (0.048) 
On widow(er) pension 0.014 (0.017)    public admin, defense 0.106 (0.067) 
On social assistance 0.005 (0.012)    education 0.117 (0.067) 
On sick money 0.042 (0.030)    health, social work 0.151 (0.069) 
Rec’d SM in year 0.118 (0.050)    other services 0.033 (0.030) 
Income/wealthc  1995-1999 PDRc  
   personal income 250928 (37088)    10-30% 0.173 (0.078) 
   other HH income 226370 (70577)    30-60% 0.081 (0.055) 
   net HH wealth 177065 (295593)    60-100%  0.129 (0.076) 
Emp status: PT 0.124 (0.058)    100% 0.074 (0.050) 
Tenure ≥1 yr 0.917 (0.043) Peer group population 118.9 (115.8) 
a Characteristics measured at end of 1995 unless otherwise indicated. 
b Includes workers entering DP prior to death, emigrating, or drawing early retirement. 
c Measures decline in employment (FTEs) in worker’s 1995 plant of employment, set to zero for plants 
with fewer than 5 FTEs in 1995. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (cont.) 
Panel C:  Neighborhood and Municipality Characteristics 
Characteristic Fraction/Mean (s.d.) Characteristic Fraction/Mean (s.d.) 
Neighborhood (1995)   Municipality (1995)   
   total populationa 692.3 (607.7)    total populationa 75828.0 (116071.9) 
   fraction immigrant 0.049 (0.058)    fraction immigrant 0.055 (0.045) 
   fraction <18 y.o.a 0.225 (0.065)    fraction <18 y.o.a 0.222 (0.031) 
   fraction 18-41 y.o.a 0.518 (0.074)    fraction 18-41 y.o.a 0.529 (0.025) 
   fraction ≥62 y.o.a 0.180 (0.090)    fraction ≥62 y.o.a 0.192 (0.036) 
   mean incomeb 174283 (32351)    mean incomeb 170159 (21851) 
   mean wealthb 35685 (128383)    mean wealthb 32770 (45732) 
0   unemployment rateb 0.136 (0.061)    unemployment rateb 0.144 (0.046) 
   fract. emp’d FTc 0.546 (0.099)    fract. emp’d FTe 0.524 (0.075) 
   fract. emp’d PTc 0.076 (0.033)    fract. emp’d PTe 0.073 (0.017) 
   fract. emp’d MPTc 0.056 (0.029)    fract. emp’d MPTe 0.057 (0.017) 
   fract. self-emp’dc  0.071 (0.052)    fract. self-emp’de 0.080 (0.039) 
   fract. perm. DPc 0.115 (0.061)    fract. perm. DPe 0.122 (0.032) 
   fract. temp. DPc 0.002 (0.005)    fract. temp. DPe 0.002 (0.002) 
   fract. rehab pensionc  0.019 (0.016)    fract. rehab pensione  0.020 (0.007) 
   fract. day moneyc 0.043 (0.028)    fract. day moneye 0.045 (0.016) 
   fract. unemployedc 0.012 (0.013)    fract. unemployede 0.013 (0.004) 
Neighborhood (1999)  Municipality (1999)  
   mean incomeb,d 220396 (41567)    mean incomeb 216682 (29146) 
   unemployment rateb,d  0.075 (0.045)    unemployment rateb  0.079 (0.034) 
   <20 in neighborhoodb  0.007 (0.083)   
a Calculated over native Norwegians. 
b Calculated over natives age 22-67.   
c Calculated over natives age 41-62. 
d Set to missing if neighborhood no longer exists or contains fewer than 20 natives age 22-67 in 1999. 
e Calculated over natives age 41-62 excluding those in worker’s neighborhood. 
 
Table Notes: N=378148. Sample consists of workers, age 45-63 in 1999, employed FT or PT in 1995 
and 1999, excluding those in small 1999 plants (<5 FTEs), on social assistance in 1999, missing 
income/wealth variables in 1999, or having fewer than 10 persons in defined peer group (see text for 
definition). 
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Table 6:  Specification Tests: Neighborhood Disability Participation and Employment Rates by 
Year 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Panel A 
Dependent variable: Neighborhood DP rate  
  
Peer 2000 DP rate  .061  
(.086) 
.029  
(.089) 
.031  
(.090) 
.047 
(.091) 
mean .087 .094 .105 .116 
Panel B 
Dependent variable: Neighborhood LFP rate  
  
Peer 2000 DP rate  .181  
(.164) 
.204  
(.152) 
.128 
(.144) 
.033 
(.148) 
mean .622 .619 .625 .622 
Notes: N=378148. 2SLS estimates using preferred instrument set. Dependent variables calculated over persons 
age 41-62 in 1995 neighborhood, defined as fraction receiving DP at end or year (Panel A), or fraction employed 
FT or PT at end of year (Panel B). All estimates adjusted for peer group, neighborhood and municipality 
characteristics in 1995, and individual characteristics in 1999, excluding neighborhood-level 
employment/program status variables (i.e. fraction employed FT, employed PT, employed MPT, self-employed, 
receiving permanent DP, receiving temporary DP, receiving rehabilitation pension, receiving day money, and 
unemployed without day money). Conventional robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for non-
independent residuals within neighborhoods.  +, * and ** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.    
 
 
Table 7: Effect of Social Interaction on Disability Pension Entry by Year 
Dependent variable: DP utilization in year   
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Peer 2000 DP rate  .137** 
(.050) 
.180* 
(.074) 
.313** 
(.097) 
.504** 
(.123) 
mean .013 .029 .049 .069 
N 378148 378148 378148 378148 
Notes: N=378148. Notes: 2SLS estimates using preferred instrument set. All estimates adjusted for peer group, 
neighborhood and municipality characteristics in 1995, and individual characteristics in 1999. Conventional 
robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for non-independent residuals within neighborhoods.  +, * and ** 
denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. 
 
 
